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Articles
TITLE IX AFTER THIRTY-FOUR YEARS -
RETALIATION IS NOT ALLOWED ACCORDING TO THE
SUPREME COURT IN JACKSON V BIRMINGHAM
BOARD OF EDUCATION
SUE ANN MOTA*
A. INTRODUCTION
In 1972, Congress enacted Title IX to ensure that no person in
the U.S. would be excluded from, denied the benefits of, or sub-
jected to discrimination by any educational institution receiving
federal funds on the basis of sex.1 In its thirty-four year history,
Title IX has been the subject of an implementing regulation;2 a
policy interpretation, including a three-prong test;3 a clarification
of the three-prong test;4 a further clarification of that test;5 and
* Professor, Department of Legal Studies, Bowling Green State University;
J.D., University of Toledo College of Law, Order of the Coif, M.A. and B.A., Bowling
Green State University. The author is currently serving as Chair of the Steering
Committee for the NCAA Ten-Year Self-Study at B.G.S.U., and has served for nu-
merous terms as Chair of the Intercollegiate Athletics Committee and Chair of the
Equity.
1. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (2005) (providing for prohibition against discrimi-
nation and applicable exception). This author will use the statutory term "sex,"
throughout this article. While acknowledging that many prefer the more current
term "gender," the statutory term will be used in this article only for the sake of
consistency. For a further discussion of this statute, see infra notes 25-33 and ac-
companying text.
2. See 34 C.F.R. § 106 (1975) (noting implementing regulation effectuating
Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972). For a further discussion of this stat-
ute, see infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
3. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation;
Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,417 (Dec. 11, 1979)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 86) (noting origin of three-prong test). For a fur-
ther discussion of the policy interpretation, see infra notes 42-57 and accompany-
ing text.
4. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEP'T OF EDUCATION, CLARIFICATION OF INTER-
COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS POLICY GUIDANCE: THE THREE-PART TEST (Jan. 16, 1996),
[hereinafter THREE-PART TEST] http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/
clarific.html (noting clarification of three prong-test). For a discussion of the
three prong-test, see infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
5. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEP'T OF EDUCATION, FURTHER CLARIFICATION
OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS GUIDANCE REGARDING TITLE IX COMPLIANCE (Jul.
11, 2003), http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/title9guidancefinal.pdf
[hereinafter OCR CLARIFICATION] (clarifying requirements and scope of Title IX).
(245)
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most recently, additional clarification of the three prong-test 6 and a
guide to developing student interest surveys under Title IX.7 Title
IX has also been the subject of extensive litigation, including Su-
preme Court decisions in Cannon v. University of Chicago,8 North Ha-
ven Board of Education v. Bell,9 Grove City College v. Bell,10 Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools,11 Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District,12 Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,13 and most re-
cently in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education (Jackson 111). 14 Ti-
tle IX has additionally been the subject of numerous other circuit
court decisions. 15
6. See OFFIcE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEP'T OF EDUCATION, ADDITIONAL CLARIFICA-
TION OF INTERCOLLEGIATE POLICY: THREE-PART TEST - PART THREE (Mar. 17,
2005), http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/title9guidanceadditional.
pdf (clarifying requirements and scope of Title IX). For a further discussion of the
additional clarification, see infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
7. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, USER'S GUIDE TO DEVELOPING STUDENT INTER-
EST SURVEYS UNDER TITLE IX (Mar. 2005), http://www.nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/
2005173.pdf [hereinafter SURVEYS] (providing guidelines for conducting student
interest surveys). For a further discussion of the student interest surveys, see infra
notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
8. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). For a further discussion of Cannon v. University of
Chicago, see infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
9. 456 U.S. 512 (1982). For a further discussion of North Haven Board of Edu-
cation v. Bell, see infra note 60 and accompanying text.
10. 465 U.S. 555 (1984). For a further discussion of Grove City College v. Bell,
see infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
11. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). For a further discussion of Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Public Schools, see infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
12. 524 U.S. 274 (1998). For a further discussion of Gebser v. Lago Vista Inde-
pendent School District, see infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
13. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). For a further discussion of Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education, see infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
14. 125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005). For a further discussion of Jackson v. Birmingham
Board of Education (Jackson III), see infra notes 133-59 and accompanying text.
15. See generally Pederson v. La. State. Univ., 201 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2000) (su-
ing university to field intercollegiate softball and soccer teams); Cohen v. Brown
Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (bringing class action suit for demotion of
women's gymnastics and volleyball teams from university-funded varsity status to
donor-funded varsity status); Homer v. Ky. High School Athletics Ass'n, 43 F.3d
265 (6th Cir. 1994) (suing Kentucky Board of Education for discrimination con-
cerning interscholastic activities); Kelley v. Bd. of Tr., 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994)
(bringing suit for elimination of men's swim team); Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 7
F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993) (alleging discrimination for elimination of women's field
hockey and gymnastics team); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824
(10th Cir. 1993) (challenging discontinuation of women's fast pitch softball team),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993); Cook v. Colgate Univ., 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993)
(bringing action to force university to elevate women's hockey team to varsity
level); Diane Heckman, The Glass Sneaker: Thirty Years of Victories and Defeats Involv-
ing Title IX and Sex Discrimination in Athletics, 13 FORDHAM INTrELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENr. L.J. 551 (2003) (examining aspects of Title IX and continuing problems after
thirty years of enforcement); Sue Ann Mota, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics- The
First Circuit Holds Brown University Not In Compliance, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. SPORTS L.
[Vol. 13: p. 245
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Moreover, Title IX has sparked numerous debates and strong
feelings on both sides. Some estimate that more than 350 men's
athletic programs have been eliminated in response, at least in part,
to Title IX's demands. 16 Others, however, opine that, "while im-
pressive strides have been made for female students since Title IX's
inception thirty years ago, females are still imbued with the attitude
that athletic employment, participation opportunities, and benefits
are a gift and not an entitlement."17
Because of the interest in, and controversy sparked by, Title
IX, this Article addresses its statutory, regulatory, and Supreme
Court jurisprudential history. This Article then analyzes Jackson v.
Birmingham Board of Education (Jackson III), the most recent Su-
preme Court decision on Title IX at the time of this publication.18
On March 29, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark rul-
ing in Jackson 119 that Title IX 20 encompasses a private right of
action for a claim of retaliation against an individual who has al-
leged sex discrimination on behalf of another. While Title IX itself
does not expressly mention retaliation, the Court majority held that
prior Supreme Court decisions have consistently and broadly inter-
preted Title IX to include intentional sex discrimination. 21 The
Court also held that the Birmingham Board of Education should
have realized discriminatory retaliation would not be allowed under
REv. 152 (1997) (discussing landmark decision concerning Title IX and Brown
University's women's athletic program); Ted Riley Cheesebrough, Note, Cohen v.
Brown: IAm Woman, Hear Me Score, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 295 (1998) (noting
progress and continuing difficulties under Title IX); Dawn N. Zubrick, Note, Strik-
ing Out with Title IX: Homer v. Kentucky High School Athletic Ass'n and the Sixth
Circuit's Interpretation of Unintentional Discrimination Under Title IX and the Possibility of
Recovering Monetary Damages, 8 ViLL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 421 (2002) (examining
when compensatory damages are permitted under Title IX).
16. See generally David Klinker, Comment, Why Conforming with Title IX Hurts
Men's Collegiate Sports, 13 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 73 (2003) (detailing Title IX's
negative effects on men's athletics); Megan K. Starace, Comment, Reverse Discrimi-
nation Under Title IX: Do Men Have a Sporting Chance?, 8 ViLL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
189 (2001) (examining effects of Title IX on certain male sports). But see Nicole
Stern, Preserving and Protecting Title IX: An Analysis and History of Advocacy and Back-
lash, 10 SPORTS LAwJ. 155, 155 (2003) ("It's not women's sports that have reduced
men's sports in this country. It's budget restraints, and the fact that highly visible
men's sports are very expensive, so they've squeezed the other men's sports.").
17. Heckman, supra note 15, at 553.
18. See Jackson III, 125 S. Ct. at 1502 (discussing case's holding).
19. See id. at 1467 (describing holding of case and noting March 29, 2005 as
date of decision). For a further discussion of Jackson III, see infra notes 133-59 and
accompanying text.
20. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2005). For a further discussion of § 1681(c), see
infra note 25 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of Jackson III and the Court's interpretation, see
infra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
2006]
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Title IX.22 Four Justices dissented, requiring the statute itself to
show a plain intent to provide such a cause of action.2 3 Given those
facts, this Article analyzes this landmark case's majority and dissent-
ing opinions. The analysis includes a comparison of Title IX, which
now encompasses claims of retaliation, with other federal employ-
ment rights statutes also allowing retaliation claims. The Article
also speculates as to a potentially different outcome if the case had
been heard by the Court one year later, due to its changed compo-
sition. This Article concludes with recommendations for educa-
tional institutions post-Jackson 111.24 The most important lesson is
that educational institutions receiving federal funds are now on no-
tice that retaliation against an individual alleging sex discrimination
constitutes an actionable offense under Title IX.
B. TITLE IX AND ITS THIRTY-FOUR YEAR HISTORY
This section discusses Title IX's statutory, regulatory, and Su-
preme Court jurisprudence in chronological order. Title IX of the
Educational Amendment of 1972 provides that no person in the
United States shall be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educa-
tional program 25 or activity26 receiving federal financial assistance,
on the basis of sex, with specified exceptions. 27 Title IX does not
require any educational institution to grant preferential or dispa-
rate treatment to members of one sex to remedy an imbalance in
the number or percentage of persons of that sex receiving federal
22. See Jackson III, 125 S. Ct. at 1509 ("The Board could not have realistically
supposed that, given this context, it remained free to retaliate against those who
reported sex discrimination.").
23. See id. at 1510 (ThomasJ., dissenting) ("[I]n cases in which a party asserts
that a cause of action should be implied, we require that the statute itself evince a
plain intent to provide such a cause of action.").
24. See generally id. (discussing educational institution's notice that retaliatory
tactics may constitute actionable defense).
25. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (2005) ("For purposes of this title an educational
institution means any public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary
school, or any institution of vocational, professional, or higher education.").
"[E]xcept that in the case of an educational institution composed of more than
one school, college, or department which are administratively separate units, such
term means each such school, college, or department." Id.
26. See id. § 1687 (interpreting "program" and "activity" within meaning of
statute).
27. See id. § 1681 (a) (highlighting exceptions to prohibition against discrimi-
nation). This author notes exceptions to Title IX, including religious organiza-
tions, educational institutions, military training educational institutions, social
fraternities and sororities, boy or girl conferences, father-son or mother-daughter
activities at educational institutions, and beauty pageants. See id.
[Vol. 13: p. 245
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support in comparison to the total number or percentage of that
sex in the community, state, section, or other area.28 Title IX's ex-
pressed remedy is the cessation of federal funds to institutions in
violation. 29 Title IX applies to all educational programs receiving
federal funds,30 not just athletic programs.31 Much of Title IX's
regulation and litigation, however, has occurred around athletics,
both at the high school 32 and college levels.33
In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
("HEW") promulgated an implementing regulation pursuant to Ti-
tle IX.34 This regulation states that "no person shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
be treated differently from another person or be otherwise discrimi-
nated against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club, or intra-
mural athletics . . . . "3 This regulation requires educational
institutions receiving federal funds to award athletic scholarships in
proportion to the number of students participating in intercollegi-
ate athletics. 36
According to the regulation, equal athletic opportunities
should be afforded to members of both sexes.3 7 When determining
equal opportunities, some of the following factors may be consid-
ered: selection of sports, competition, practice schedules, medical
28. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (clarifying required means of achieving propor-
tionality).
29. See id. § 1682 (noting remedy for violating Title IX directives). The Office
for Civil Rights ("OCR") in the Department of Education ("DOE") has the power
to terminate federal funding for institutions not in compliance. But see Gayle I.
Horwitz, Education Law Chapter: Athletics, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 311, 327 (2004)
(noting as of 2004, however, OCR has yet to remove federal funding).
30. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (defining "educational institutions").
31. See Berkelman v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 501 F.2d 1264, 1270 (9th Cir.
1974) (ruling school district may not apply higher admissions standards to girls
than boys).
32. See, e.g., Brendan v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 477 F.2d 1292, 1295 (8th Cir. 1973)
(deeming failure to offer female high school students right to participate in non-
contact interscholastic sports when such teams were provided for male students
discriminatorily).
33. For a discussion of Title IX circuit court cases, see supra note 15 and ac-
companying text.
34. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (2005) (detailing prohibition of discrimination on
basis of sex in athletic programs). Although some subsections of 34 C.F.R. § 106
deal with non-athletic issues, this Article will only examine relevant subsections.
35. Id. § 106.41(a) (requiring members of excluded sex must be allowed to
try out for teams). But see id. § 106.41 (b) (providing exception if team selection is
based upon competitive skill or if activity is contact sport).
36. See id. § 106.37(c) (1) (explaining separate athletic scholarships for mem-
bers of each sex may be provided as part of separate athletic teams).
37. See id. § 106.41(c) (noting requirements of regulation).
20061
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and training facilities, housing and dining facilities, and publicity.38
The regulation also provides for sex-separated teams for contact
sports, "including boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football,
and basketball ... .,,19 Additionally, this regulation prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of sex in employment in education pro-
grams or activities. 40 Furthermore, the procedural provisions of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were adopted and incorpo-
rated into Title IX.41
In 1979, HEW published a Policy Interpretation in the Federal
Register to clarify federal aid recipients' obligations under Title
IX.42 The Policy Interpretation considered several areas in making
a determination as to what constitutes "equal opportunity" in inter-
collegiate athletics. 43 These areas include: athletic scholarships,
other program areas, and effective accommodation of interests and
abilities. Reasonable opportunity for financial assistance awards
must be provided for members of both sexes in proportion to the
number of students of each sex participating in intercollegiate ath-
38. See id. The relevant statute section provides the following factors:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively
accommodate the interest and abilities of both sexes; (2) The provision
of equipment and supplies; (3) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) Travel and per diem allowance; (5) Opportunity to receive coaching
and academic tutoring; (6) Assignment and compensation of coaches
and tutors; (7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facili-
ties; (8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services; (9) Pro-
vision of housing and dining facilities and services; (10) Publicity.
Id.
39. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c).
40. See id. § 106.51 ("No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination in em-
ployment... under any education program or activity [receiving federal funds].").
This requirement applies to recruitment, hiring, compensation rates, job assign-
ments, collective bargaining agreements, job leave, fringe benefits, training, em-
ployer-sponsored activities, or any other term of employment. Id. § 106.51(b).
41. See id. § 106.71 (incorporating Tide VI of Civil Rights Act into Title IX).
42. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpreta-
tion; Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,415 (Dec. 11,
1979) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 86) (elucidating obligations of federal aid
recipients under Title IX).
43. See id. at 71,413-23 (stating evaluation methods under Title IX). In 1979,
after issuance of the Policy Interpretation, HEW was split, and the DOE was cre-
ated. The DOE never formally adopted the Policy Interpretation. Despite Title IX
requirements, neither Congress nor the President approved the Policy Interpreta-
tion. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2005); see also Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health
Review Comm'n., 499 U.S. 144, 150 (1991) (noting Policy Interpretation has re-
ceived substantial deference from courts); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888,
895 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing sufficiency of educational athletic program to avoid
liability under Title IX); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828
(10th Cir. 1993) (discussing Title IX violations when university discontinued wo-
men's varsity softball program).
[Vol. 13: p. 245
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letics.4 4 The eleven other program areas are: 45 equipment and
supplies, 46 scheduling of games and practice time, 47 travel and per
diem allowance, 48 coaches,49 tutors,50 locker rooms, practice and
44. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpreta-
tion; Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,413, 71,415 (describ-
ing applicable intercollegiate athletic programs). Compliance with this provision
is examined by comparing each sex participating in intercollegiate athletics, but
not to the student body population as a whole. See id. Also, compliance may still
be found if a disparity results from legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors, such as
team development or the higher cost of out-of-state tuition in some years. See id.
45. See id. (noting list is not exhaustive and is slightly expanded from 1975
implementing regulation).
46. See 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c)(2) (2005); Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation; Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44
Fed. Reg. at 71,416 (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c) (2)) (defining
"equipment and supplies" to include uniform and other apparel, sport-specific and
general equipment and supplies, instructional devices, and conditioning and
weight conditioning devices). Compliance is assessed by examining, among other
factors, the equivalence for men and women of the quality, amount, suitability,
maintenance, replacement, and availability of equipment and supplies. See Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation; Title IX and Inter-
collegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,416.
47. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpreta-
tion; Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,416 (detailing factors
considered in assessing institution's compliance with Title IX). Compliance in
scheduling games and practice times is assessed using factors:
[E]xamining, among other[s] ... the equivalence for men and women
of: (1) The number of competitive events per sport; (2) The number and
length of practice opportunities; (3) The time of day competitive events
... ; (4) The time of day practice opportunities are scheduled; and (5)
The opportunities to engage in available pre-season and post-season
competition.
Id.
48. See id. (setting forth factors for consideration in evaluating institution's
equal opportunities). Compliance in "Travel and Per Diem Allowances" is "as-
sessed by examining, among other factors, the equivalence for men and women of:
(1) Modes of transportation; (2) Housing furnished during travel; (3) Length of
stay before and after competitive events; (4) Per diem allowances; and (5) Dining
arrangements." Id.
49. See id. (enumerating areas considered in determining school's compliance
with Title IX regulation). Under "Coaching and Academic Tutoring," compliance
with the opportunity to receive coaching is "assessed by ... : (a) Relative availabil-
ity of full-time coaches; (b) Relative availability of part-time and assistant coaches;
and (c) Relative availability of graduate assistants." Id.
50. See id. (describing additional grounds for violation of Title IX). Under
the "Assignment and Compensation of Tutors," in general, a violation will be
found only where compensation or assignment policies or practices deny male and
female athletes equivalent coaching in quality, availability, and nature. See 45
C.F.R. § 86.41(c) (6) (2005). Compensation of coaches is assessed by examining,
among other things, the coaches of men's and women's teams for equivalence in:
"(a) Rate of compensation (per sport, per season); (b) Duration of contracts; (c)
Conditions relating to contract renewal; (d) Experience; (e) Nature of coaching
duties performed; (f) Working conditions; and (g) Other terms and conditions of
employment." Id.
2006]
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competitive facilities,5 1 medical and training facilities and ser-
vices,5 2 housing and dining facilities and services,53 publicity,5 4 sup-
port services, 55 and recruitment of student athletes.56
Effective accommodation under the Policy Interpretation is as-
sessed using a three-prong test; an institution, however, must only
comply with one of the prongs. The three prongs are: (1) whether
the participation opportunities are provided in numbers substan-
tially proportional to enrollments; (2) whether there is a history
and continuing practice of program expansion for the under-
represented sex; or (3) whether the interests and abilities of the
underrepresented sex have been fully and effectively accommo-
dated.57
In addition to the 1979 Policy Interpretation, the U.S. Su-
preme Court decided in Cannon v. University of Chicago,58 that Title
IX does provide for a private right of action, although not expressly
51. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpreta-
tion; Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,416-17 (listing factors
examined when assessing institution's fulfillment of equal opportunities under Ti-
de IX). Under this provision, compliance is assessed by determining equivalency
in: "(1) Quality and availability of the facilities provided for practice and competi-
tive events; (2) Exclusivity of use of [such] facilities ... ; (3) Availability of locker
rooms; (4) Quality of locker rooms; (5) Maintenance of practice and competitive
facilities; and (6) Preparation of facilities for practice and competitive events." Id.
52. See id. (enumerating additional factors for Title IX compliance). Under
the provision of "Medical and Training Facilities and Services," compliance is as-
sessed by equivalency in: "(1) Availability of medical personnel and assistance; (2)
Health, accident and injury insurance coverage; (3) Availability and quality of
weight and training facilities; (4) Availability and quality of conditioning facilities;
and (5) Availability and qualifications of athletic trainers." Id.
53. See id. (providing areas to be evaluated for determining Title IX compli-
ance). Under the provision of "Housing and Dining Facilities and Services," com-
pliance is assessed by examining whether men's and women's opportunities are
equivalent in housing provided, as well as special services included as a part of the
housing, such as laundry, maid, and parking services. See id.
54. See id. (detailing additional areas for evaluating compliance with Title IX).
"Publicity" compliance is assessed by equivalence in: "(1) Availability and quality of
sports information personnel; (2) Access to other publicity resources... ; and
(3)Quantity and quality of publications and other promotional devices. .. " Id.
55. See id. (providing compliance is assessed by examining amount of adminis-
trative, clerical, and secretarial assistance provided).
56. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpreta-
tion; Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,416 (assessing com-
pliance by examining recruitment practices to see if they need modification).
Such an examination will determine if there are substantially equal opportunities
to recruit, whether resources "are equivalently adequate to meet [recruiting]
needs.. .", and whether there is "a disproportionately limiting effect" on recruit-
ment. Id.
57. See id. at 71,418 (announcing three main ways in which institutions' com-
pliance is evaluated under Title IX).
58. 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (addressing whether plaintiff had private cause of
action under Title IX). Notably, Cannon is not an athletics case. The plaintiff,
[Vol. 13: p. 245
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authorized by the statute. The plaintiff prevailed because she was
discriminated against on the basis of sex. The Court recognized the
case as a limited situation in which all the circumstances supported
an implied remedy, but suggested that the better approach would
be for Congress to specify these rights. 59 In his concurrence, Jus-
tice Rehnquist stated that "this Court in the future should be ex-
tremely reluctant to imply a cause of action absent such specificity
on the part of the Legislative Branch. ' 60 Then, in Grove City College
v. Bell,61 the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the "program or
activity" Tide IX language and effectively removed athletic depart-
ments from Title IX's coverage. The Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987 re-established broad institution-wide application of the civil
rights statutory provisions, including Title IX, for any part of the
federally funded institution.62
In 1992, the Supreme Court held in Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Public Schools63 that the implied right of private action under Title
IX recognized in Cannon v. University of Chicago supports a claim for
monetary damages. 64 The Court held that there is a traditional pre-
sumption favoring the availability of relief for violation of a federal
right and that the passage of the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization
Act of 198665 and the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 198766 implied
that Congress did not intend to limit remedies.67 Justice Scalia,
Geraldine Cannon, alleged that she was denied admission to medical school be-
cause she was a woman. See id. at 680.
59. See id. at 717 (recognizing lack of explicit statutory reference to private
right of action under Title IX).
60. Id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasizing importance of statu-
tory construction to ensure Congressional intent). The second Supreme Court
decision on Title IX occurred in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512
(1982), when the Court upheld the validity of certain Title IX regulations.
61. 465 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1984) (stating holding of case).
62. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28
(1988) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1687) (applying civil rights regulations
statutes to federal fund recipients irrespective of allocation or distribution of spe-
cific funds to institution).
63. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
64. See id. at 72 (upholding monetary damages based on implied right recog-
nized in Cannon). Although not an athletics case per se, the plaintiff in Franklin
alleged that a sports coach and teacher sexually harassed her. See id. at 63-64. The
school investigated, but allegedly took no further action, and actually discouraged
Franklin from pressing charges. See id.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a) (2005) (abrogating state's sovereign immunity
under Eleventh Amendment when state accepts federal funds under certain fed-
eral statutes including Title IX).
66. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2000).
67. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66 (asserting Court presumes all remedies availa-
ble, "unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise").
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joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, concurred in
the disposition of the case, but they stated that the notion of im-
plied causes of action should perhaps be abandoned, especially
where the Court requires limitations on remedies to be expressly
stated. 6
8
In 1996, the Office for Civil Rights ("OCR"), the enforcement
agency for Title IX within the Department of Education ("DOE") ,69
issued a "Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance:
The Three Prong Test."7 0 The Clarification maintained existing
standards and reiterated that only one prong needed to be satisfied
for a school to be compliant with Tide IX.71 While the Policy Inter-
pretation is tailored to intercollegiate athletics, the general princi-
ples of both the Policy Interpretation and the Clarification also
apply to elementary and secondary interscholastic programs. 72
In 1997, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") issued an "Enforcement Guidance on Sex Discrimina-
tion in the Compensation of Sports Coaches in Educational Institu-
tions."73 Studies showed salary differentials between the head and
assistant coaches of men's and women's teams in educational insti-
tutions. According to the NCAA, men's sports in Division I institu-
tions received sixty percent of money budgeted for the head
coaches' salaries and seventy-six percent of the assistant coaches'
salaries.7 4
68. See id. at 77-78 (ScaliaJ., concurring) (criticizing majority for explicit stat-
utory indication of limiting remedies despite allowing implied right of action).
69. See 20 U.S.C. § 3441 (a) (3) (2005) (authorizing transfer of various re-
sponsibilities under HEW, including enforcement of Title IX, to OCR secretary).
Prior to this, in 1990, the OCR issued a "Title IX Investigator's Manual."
70. See THREE-PART TEST, supra note 4 (attempting to clarify test's legal
intricacies).
71. See id. (clarifying standard of Title IX regulations). Under the propor-
tionality prong, for example, if a school's population was 52 percent male and 48
percent female, and the student athlete proportion was the same as the general
student population, the institution would not have to fine-tune its program if
males in the student body dropped to 51 percent. See id. Under effective accom-
modation, the OCR will consider whether there is: 1) an unmet interest in a partic-
ular sport; 2) a sufficient ability to sustain a team in the sport; and 3) a reasonable
expectation of competition for the team. See id. If all three conditions are present,
the OCR will find that an institution has not fully and effectively accommodated
the interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex. See id.
72. See id. (summarizing Title IX's broad scope of intercollegiate, elementary,
and secondary programs).
73. See U.S. EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, NOTICE No. 915.002, EN-
FORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE COMPENSATION OF SPORTS
COACHES IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUIIONS (Oct. 29, 1997), http://www.eeoc.gov/
policy/docs/coaches.html [hereinafter EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE] (examin-
ing differences in compensation between male and female coaches).
74. See id. (providing statistical data on athletic coach pay differentials).
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The federal Equal Pay Act prohibits unequal pay for equal
work on the basis of sex if the performance requires equal skill,
effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions. 75 Title
VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, as well as race,
color, religion, and national origin, in compensation, terms, condi-
tions, and privileges of employment. 76 According to the EEOC,
there is considerable overlap between the two statutes. Once the
plaintiff shows that the jobs are substantially equal and the plaintiff
is paid less, the burden shifts to the employer to show an affirmative
defense.7 7 Under the Equal Pay Act, some defenses for the exis-
tence of differential pay are seniority, merit, quantity or quality of
production, or any factor other than sex. 78 The EEOC Enforce-
ment Guidance stated that the EEOC is aware of the disparities in
pay for coaches in educational institutions and will analyze such
cases carefully. 79
In 1998, the OCR issued a "Policy Guidance for Athletic Schol-
arships."80 On the twenty-fifth anniversary of Title IX, twenty-five
educational institutions had complaints filed against them with the
OCR, alleging noncompliance with Title IX in the area of athletic
scholarships. Bowling Green State University ("BGSU") was one of
the institutions, and the former general counsel for BGSU re-
quested guidance from the EEOC. In a letter, the EEOC stated that
exact proportionality down to the last dollar is not required.
Rather, on a case-by-case basis, any disparity can take into account
nondiscriminatory issues, and "if any unexplained disparity is one
percent or less of the entire budget for athletic scholarships, there
will be a strong presumption that such a disparity is reasonable and
based upon legitimate nondiscriminatory factors." 8'
75. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000) (detailing prohibitions on discrimina-
tion regarding equal pay).
76. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Tide VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2) (2000)
(providing regulations prohibiting employment discrimination).
77. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 73 (explaining burden-
shifting claim).
78. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000) (detailing defenses to charges of dis-
criminatory compensation).
79. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 73 (explicating policies on
athletic coaches' salaries among educational institutions).
80. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, DEAR COLLEAGUE
LETER: BOWLING GREEN STATE UNIVERSITY (July 23, 1998), http://www.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/docs/bowlgrn.html (providing further guidance on Tide
IX requirements for athletic scholarships).
81. Id. (clarifying proportionality requirement as applied to athletic
scholarships).
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In 1998, the Supreme Court held in a five-to-four decision that
a school district may not be liable for damages stemming from an
implied right of action under Title IX for sexual harassment of a
student by a teacher unless a school district official, authorized to
take correct measures, had both actual notice of and was indiffer-
ent to the teacher's misconduct.82 In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
School District, the majority held that unless Congress speaks directly
on the subject, "we will not hold a school district liable in damages
under Title IX for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student absent
actual notice and deliberate indifference."83
Contrastingly, in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, a
five-to-four decision written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme
Court held that a private action is available against a public school
board for Title IX sex discrimination if the board acted with delib-
erate indifference to acts of student-on-student sexual harassment
which were sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive.84
The dissent in Davis, authored by Justice Kennedy and joined by
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, andJustice Thomas, asserted
that because Title IX was enacted under the Constitution's Spend-
ing Clause, limitations existed requiring states to have clear notice
of their monetary liability.85 The dissent found it "striking" that Ti-
tle IX does not create any cause of action and the only private cause
of action was judicially implied in Cannon v. University of Chicago.86
The dissent also had difficulty with the majority's holding because
82. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292 (1998)
(O'Connor, J., majority) (detailing importance of notice requirement). A Gebser
high school student had a sexual relationship with one of her teachers. Neither
Gebser, nor the teacher involved, reported the relationship. See id. at 278. The
teacher was arrested and fired after the pair was caught engaged in sex. The
school district had not distributed an official grievance procedure or anti-harass-
ment policy, although it was required to do so by federal regulations. See id. After
other students' parents complained about this teacher's offensive remarks in class,
the principal talked to the teacher, but did not report the teacher to the superin-
tendent. See id.
83. Id. at 292-93. The majority noted that an individual still may have a cause
of action against the school district under state law, against the teacher in his or
her individual capacity under state law, or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. Justices
Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg dissented. See generally David S. Cohen, Lim-
iting Gebser: Institutional Liability for Non-Harassment Sex Discrimination Under Title
IX 39 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 311 (2004) (discussing Gebser decision and concluding
Supreme Court erroneously removed agency principles from Title IX sexual har-
assment cases).
84. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (sum-
marizing holding of case).
85. See id. at 656-57 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing contextual back-
ground of Title IX).
86. See id. at 656 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing significance of Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979)).
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Title IX does not give schools clear, "unambiguous notice that they
are liable in damages for failure to remedy discrimination by their
students."8 7 Therefore, the dissent concluded that the discrimina-
tion in Davis was not authorized by or in accordance with actions by
the federal grant recipient.88 Thus, they opined that the majority's
ruling would bring more suits, causing serious financial burdens on
school districts, taxpayers, and school children.89
In 2001, the Supreme Court heard Alexander v. Sandoval,90 a
case brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196491 as op-
posed to Title IX.92 The court held that private individuals do not
have a right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations.93 In
a five-to-four decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Court held
that Title VI as enacted or amended does not display an intent to
create a private right of action, and therefore, no such right
exists. 94
The DOE created a Commission on Opportunities in Athletics
in 2002, which issued a report in 2003 entitled "Open to All". Title IX
at Thirty.95 Shortly thereafter, the OCR issued a "Further Clarifica-
tion of Athletics Policy Guidance Regarding Title IX Compliance,"
stating that elimination of teams is not favored, and it would seek
remedies that preserve rather than eliminate athletic
opportunities.9 6
In March 2005, the OCR issued an "Additional Clarification of
Intercollegiate Athletics Policy: Three-Part Test- Part Three"
87. Id. at 658 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (analyzing majority opinion).
88. See id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (contending that liability for dis-
crimination should not be imputed to school).
89. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 686 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (summarizing dissent).
90. See 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (explaining holding). Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Justice Scalia. Sandoval is
not a Title IX case. In Sandoval, an Alabama resident initiated a class action suit
over Alabama's "English-only" rule, which precluded otherwise qualified Alabama
drivers from obtaining an Alabama driver's license because they were not fluent in
English. See id. at 278. For a further discussion of Sandoval see generally Brianne J.
Gorod, The Sorcerer's Apprentice: Sandoval, Chevron, and Agency Power to Define Pri-
vate Rights of Action, 113 YALE L.J. 939 (2003-04) (examining role of administrative
agencies in determining private rights of action from statutes).
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(d)-2000(d)(7) (2000).
92. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (2005). For a general description of Title IX provi-
sions, see supra notes 25-29.
93. See Sandova 532 U.S. at 293 (holding no private right of action under
Title VI for disparate impact claims).
94. See id. at 293 (asserting case's final conclusion).
95. See Dep't of Education (Feb. 28, 2003), http://www.ed.gov/about/bd-
scomm/list/athletics/title9report.pdf (examining current progress and impact of
Title IX).
96. See OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 5 (clarifying Title IX to readers).
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("Clarification III"). 97 The OCR reiterated that each of the three
prongs acts as a safe harbor.98 Clarification III has also sparked
controversies. In fact, on Title IX's thirty-third anniversary, the
NCAA repeated its request that the DOE withdraw the Clarifica-
tion. 99 The OCR issued a Model Survey, which could be used to
determine whether the interests and abilities of the under-
represented sex were effectively accommodated. 100 Also in March
2005, the U.S. Supreme Court heard Jackson v. Birmingham Board of
97. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION (March 17, 2005),
http: //www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/title9guidanceadditional.pdf
[hereinafter CLARIFICATION III COVER LETTER] (providing further clarification to
schools for compliance with option three of three-part test); see also Deborah
Brake, Revisiting Title IX's Feminist Legacy: Moving Beyond the Three-Part Test, 12 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'v & L. 453, 453-57 (2004) (examining Blue Ribbon Com-
mission's findings and impact on Title IX).
98. See CLARIFICATION III COVER LETTER, supra note 97 (stressing three prongs
equally serve as safe harbor). According to Clarification III, of the 130 institutions
investigated by the OCR from 1992-2003, two-thirds used the third prong: the ef-
fective accommodation of interests and abilities. See id. at v. The OCR found that
many institutions were uncertain of their obligations under part three of the test
and thus, sought to clarify the applicable factors to be considered in determining
compliance. See id. Under this prong, an institution is in compliance, unless there
exists, for the underrepresented sex, a sport for which all three conditions are met:
unmet interest sufficient to sustain a varsity team in the sport(s); sufficient ability
to sustain an intercollegiate team in the sport(s); and reasonable expectation of
intercollegiate competition for a team in the sport(s) within the school's normal
competitive region. See id. at 4.
99. See Press Release, NCAA, NCAA Urges Federal Government to Rescind
Title IX Clarification (June 22, 2005), available at http://www2.ncaa.org/media_
and-events/associationnews/association-updates/2005/june/0622_title9.html
(requesting OCR to withdraw clarification). This author opines that both the
DOE and NCAA, esteemed organizations, need to work together to help educa-
tional institutions comply. The NCAA Division I recertification process requires a
gender equity plan including the Policy Interpretation's provisions. See generally
NCAA, Division I Athletics Certification Handbook 2005-06 (May 2005), http://
www.ncaa.org/library/membership/dl-athletics-cert-handbook/2005-06/2005-06_
dl-athleticscertificationhandbook.pdf. While leaving it up to the educational
institution to decide how to achieve Title IX compliance for those institutions
choosing the proportionality prong of the three-part test, it is very difficult to
achieve proportionality when football is involved. If the NCAA objects to the
DOE's newest clarification, the NCAA needs to assist institutions by other means,
such as by reducing football scholarship funds. See Brake, supra note 97, at 469-71
(discussing competing arguments regarding cutting budgets on men's "revenue
sports" to achieve Title IX compliance).
100. See SURVEYS, supra note 7 (mentioning use of student interest surveys).
The "Survey" is actually a census. Schools must minimally include all varsity sports,
including emerging sports. Thirty-six schools used the first prong, proportionate
participation opportunities as compared to the student body. Only eight selected
the second prong where the school shows "a history and continuing practice of
program expansion" corresponding to that sex's interest. Id. at 2-3.
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Education (Jackson 111)101 to decide whether Title IX's implied right
of action encompasses claims of retaliation.
C. CLAIMS OF RETALIATION UNDER TITLE IX:
JACKSON V. BIRMINGHAM BOARD OF EDUCATION
Three federal circuit courts of appeals have examined the issue
of whether retaliation claims are actionable under Title IX. Both
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 10 2 and the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals 03 held that retaliation claims are actionable. In 2002,
however, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Jackson v. Bir-
mingham Board of Education (Jackson I), held that such claims are not
actionable.' 0 4 The federal circuits were thus split, and the U.S. Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to decide this issue. 10 5
In Preston v. Commonwealth of Virginia, the plaintiff, a New River
Community College counselor for student support services, filed
discrimination claims on the basis of race and gender with the
EEOC and the OCR in 1984. In 1985 and 1989, she applied for,
but was denied, other positions on campus. She claimed she was
denied in retaliation for the 1984 discrimination charges. 10 6
A jury held the College had retaliated against Preston in con-
sidering her for the 1989 position, but determined she would have
not been given the position even absent discrimination. The dis-
trict court thus held she was not entitled to damages.' 0 7 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed.'08 While Preston lost her case, the Court
101. 125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005). For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's
granting writ of certiorari in Jackson, see infra note 133 and accompanying text.
102. See generally Preston v. Commonwealth of Va., 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1994)
(finding retaliation claims actionable).
103. See Lowrey v. Tex. A & M Univ. System, 117 F.3d 242, 254 (5th Cir. 1997)
(upholding private right of action for retaliation claim under Title IX).
104. See 309 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding retaliation claims
under Title IX not within statute's prohibited conduct), rev'd, 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
105. See generally Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ. (Jackson II), 542 U.S.
903 (2004) (granting writ of certiorari); see also Bradford C. Mank, Are Anti-Retalia-
tion Regulations in Title VI or Title IX Enforceable in a Private Right of Action: Does
Sandoval or Sullivan Control This Question?, 35 SETON HALL L. REv. 47, 52, 104-07
(2004) (concluding courts should find private rights of action for retaliation
claims under Tide VI and Tide IX).
106. See Preston, 31 F.3d at 205 (noting school denied Preston other job posi-
tions). The district court initially granted summary judgment against Preston on
her Title VII case and dismissed her Title IX case. See id. The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. See
Preston v. Commonwealth of Va., 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18824, at *8-9 (4th Cir.
Aug. 16, 1991).
107. See Preston, 31 F.3d at 204-05 (stating Preston was retaliated against but
would not have received position even absent discrimination).
108. See id. at 208-09 (affirming district court's holding).
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of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recognized that retaliation against
an employee for filing a claim of gender discrimination under Title
IX is actionable. 10 9
In Lowrey v. Texas A & M University System, 117 F.3d 242 (5th
Cir. 1997), the plaintiff was the head women's basketball coach at
Tarleton State University and was named Women's Athletic Coordi-
nator in 1992. In 1993, Lowrey served on a Gender Equity Task
Force, which was responsible for identifying violations of Title VII
and Title IX in the athletics department. That same year, after the
Task Force report was submitted, Lowrey applied for, but was de-
nied, the position of Athletics Director. In 1994, Lowrey was re-
moved from the Women's Athletic Coordinator position, but
remained as the women's basketball coach.
Lowrey filed suit in 1995 for employment discrimination and
retaliation under Title IX, alleging employment discrimination on
the basis of sex, misallocation of resources between male and fe-
male student athletes, and continuing retaliation by denying her
the Athletic Director position and removing her from the Women's
Athletic Coordinator position.110 After she filed suit, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided Lakoski v. James, holding that
Title IX does not provide a private right of action for claims of em-
ployment discrimination based on sex.' Texas A & M University
then filed a motion to dismiss Lowrey's case based on Lakoski; Low-
rey moved to amend her complaint to add causes of action under
Title VII, the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Equal
Pay Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.112 The district court dismissed Low-
rey's complaint without first ruling on her motion to amend.' 13
In 1996, Lowrey refiled suit alleging the same claims she
sought to add in her amended complaint, except for the Title IX
claim. The Fifth Circuit held that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in denying her leave to amend, but the district court's errone-
ous denial did not divest it of jurisdiction over the Title IX claim,
on appeal.1' 4 Further, the Fifth Circuit agreed with Lowrey that a
109. See id. at 206 (recognizing retaliation claims as actionable).
110. See Lowrey v. Tex. A & M Univ. System, 117 F.3d 242, 244-45 (5th Cir.
1997) (listing Lowrey's allegations). Lowrey also joined a state law claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotion distress. See id.
111. See 66 F.3d 751, 758 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding Title IX does not allow
right of action for sex-based employment discrimination).
112. See Lourrey, 117 F.3d at 245 (detailing procedural history).
113. See id. (explaining district court's ruling).
114. See id. at 246 (holding district court abused its discretion in denying
plaintiff leave to amend complaint). Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that
the district court's refusal to allow Lowrey to amend her complaint was moot be-
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retaliation claim falls under Title IX and is not preempted by Title
VII. 115 Nevertheless, to state a claim for retaliation under Title IX,
the court required Lowrey to rely exclusively on Title IX violations,
not Title VII violations. 1 6 The court concluded that while Title IX
does not explicitly create a private right of action for retaliation,
such a course of action does exist. 117 Because Title IX creates an
implied right of action under Cannon v. University of Chicago,'18 and
a private claim for damages under Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools," 9 the Fifth Circuit held that Title IX likewise implies a pri-
vate right of action for retaliation.1 20 In 2005, the U.S. Supreme
Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit.121
In Jackson I, the Eleventh Circuit held that Title IX does not
imply a private right of action for non-victims of gender discrimina-
tion, but it does for those who suffer retaliation because they have
complained about others' gender discrimination. 22 The plaintiff,
a physical education teacher and girls' basketball coach at Ensley
High School, complained of the differential treatment afforded to
the girls' basketball team concerning funding and access to sports
equipment and facilities to no avail. 123 In May 2004, Jackson was
dismissed from his coaching position, despite remaining as a ten-
ured teacher. Jackson filed suit for retaliation under Title IX. The
cause Lowrey filed a subsequent action that included all the claims she sought to
add in her amended complaint. See id.
115. See id. at 247 (holding retaliation claim part of remedies included in Ti-
tle IX). The court stated that the "relationship between [T]itle VII and [T]itle IX
is complex, and never more so than in the instant case." Id.
116. See id. at 248 (stating Lowrey must proceed solely on Title IX violations
based on Lakoski principle of preemption for Title VII claims). The anti-retaliation
provisions of Title VII and Title IX are not identical. Title VII provides no remedy
for retaliation against individuals who raise Title IX claims. See id. at 248-49.
117. See Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 249-51 (explaining absence of private right of ac-
tion by Lowrey, on behalf of alleged victims, but entitled her to private right of
action for retaliation claim under Title IX).
118. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). For a further discussion of Cannon, see supra notes
58-60 and accompanying text.
119. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). For a further discussion of Franklin, see supra notes
63-68 and accompanying text.
120. See Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 253 (concluding Title IX implies private right of
action for retaliation). The court thus held that Lowrey could proceed with her
Title IX retaliation claim but not her Title IX employment discrimination claim.
See id. at 254.
121. SeeJackson I11, 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1509-10 (2005) (stating holding, follow-
ing Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 252).
122. SeeJackson I, 309 F.3d 1333, 1347-48 (11th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 544 U.S. 167
(2005) (holding Title IX does not imply private right of action for non-victim of
gender discrimination who complains of others' suffering from discrimination).
123. See id. at 1335 (stating background facts leading to plaintiffs suit).
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district court dismissed his complaint, and the Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education (Jackson 1).124
The court found that neither Title IX itself 12 5 nor its regula-
tions126 imply a private right of action for retaliation. 12 7 Because
Jackson 1128 was the first appellate case examining this issue, 129 after
Alexander v. Sandoval,I3 0 the appellate court did not imply a private
right of action in Title VI cases.13 ' Not only did the court find no
statutory intent, it found that even if Title IX did prevent and rem-
edy retaliation, Jackson was plainly not within Title IX's intended
protected class.1 3 2
On appeal from the Eleventh Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted a writ of certiorari to determine whether Title IX encom-
passes a third-party right of action for retaliation. 13 3 The Court
agreed with petitioner Jackson that Title IX's private right of action
encompasses claims of retaliation against an individual who com-
plains of sex discrimination.13 4
124. See id. at 1348 (affirming district court's dismissal of Jackson's com-
plaint).
125. For a further discussion of Title IX, see supra notes 25-27 and accompa-
nying text. Congress could have provided protection or relief for retaliation, but
chose not to do so either explicitly or implicitly in Title IX. See Jackson I, 309 F.3d
at 1345-46.
126. For a discussion of the relevant regulations, see supra notes 46-57 and
accompanying text.
127. See Jackson I, 309 F.3d at 1338 (holding neither Title IX nor its regulation
imply private right of action for retaliation).
128. See id. at 1338-39 (finding no private right of action in Title VI cases).
129. See id. at 1348 (discussing retaliation claims).
130. 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001). For a further discussion of Sandoval, see supra
notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
131. See Sandoval 532 U.S. at 293 (finding no private right of action in Title
VI cases).
132. See Jackson 1, 309 F.3d at 1346 (determining Jackson as non-victim of gen-
der discrimination under Title IX).
133. SeeJackson II, 542 U.S. 903, 903 (2004) (granting certiorari to decide
whether Title IX includes third party right of action for retaliation). The Court
held oral arguments on November 30, 2004, and a question arose about the OCR's
enforcement of claims. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Jackson, 544 U.S. 167
(2005) (No. 02-1672), 2004 U.S. TRANS. LEXIS 73, at *41 (Nov. 30, 2004). Re-
spondents filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental brief containing enforce-
ment dates. See Respondents' Supplemental Brief, Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of
Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (No. 02-1672). The motion was denied. SeeJackson v.
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 73 U.S.L.W. 3396 (Jan. 10, 2005) (No. 02-1672).
134. SeeJackson III, 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1502 (2005) (holding Title IX includes
claims of retaliation against individuals that complained of sex discrimination).
The United States, as amicus curiae, supported Jackson. Together, the National
School Boards Association, The American Association of School Administrators,
The American Association of Presidents of Independent Colleges and Universities,
The Association of Southern Baptist Colleges and Schools, and The Alabama Asso-
ciation of School Boards supported the respondent in an amici curiae brief. See
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Writing for the majority, and joined by Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, Justice O'Connor reviewed relevant Supreme
Court jurisprudence concerning Title IX.135 Justice O'Connor dis-
cussed Cannon and its implied private cause of action to remedy
intentional sexual discrimination under Title IX.136 Next, Justice
O'Connor discussed Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools and its
authorization of monetary damages for intentional violations of Ti-
de IX.137 Additionally, Justice O'Connor discussed Gebser v. Lago
Vista Independent School District138 and its holding which she au-
thored. She noted, "that the private right of action encompasses
intentional sex discrimination in the form of a recipient's deliber-
ate indifference to a teacher's sexual harassment of a student
.... 139 Finally, Justice O'Connor discussed Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education, another opinion she authored, in which the
Court extended Title IX's coverage to sexual harassment among
students. 140 From these cases, the Court concluded that retaliation
against a person who has complained of sex discrimination is an-
other form of intentional sex discrimination actionable under Title
IX.141
The majority acknowledged that Congress could have expressly
mentioned retaliation in Title IX, as it did in Title VII. 142 Neverthe-
less, the Court recognized the significant differences between Title
VII and Title IX. 145 The Court held that Title IX is a broadly writ-
ten general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex in edu-
cational institutions receiving federal funds. In contrast to Tide
Brief for Jackson as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Jackson v. Birmingham
Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (No. 02-1672). Additionally, the states of Ala-
bama, Delaware, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and
Virginia as amici curiae supported the respondent. See id. The Eagle Forum Educa-
tional and Legal Defense Fund, the National Wrestling Coaches Association, and
the Pacific Legal Foundation each supported the respondent as amici curiae. See id.
135. See Jackson Il, 125 S. Ct. at 1503 (discussing prior case law).
136. See id. at 1504 (discussing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979)).
For a further discussion of Cannon, see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
137. See Jackson III, 125 S. Ct. at 1504 (analyzing Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992)). For a further discussion of Franklin, see supra notes
63-68 and accompanying text.
138. See Jackson IlI, 125 S. Ct. at 1504 (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch.
Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290-91 (1998)).
139. Id. (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290-91).
140. See id. (discussing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629
(1999)). For a further discussion of Davis, see supra note 84 and accompanying
text.
141. See Jackson III, 125 S. Ct. at 1504 (O'Connor, J., majority) (stating conclu-
sion that retaliation claims are within purview of Title IX).
142. See id. at 1504-05 (analyzing Title IX, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000)).
143. See id. at 1505 (distinguishing Title VII from Title IX).
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VII, Congress did not state any prohibited discriminatory practices
in Title IX.1 4 4 Further, the broadly written Title IX does not re-
quire that the victim of the retaliation is also the victim of the
discrimination. 14
5
The Court acknowledged that the school board was correct in
asserting this requirement because of Tide IX's origin. Because Ti-
tle IX was passed under the Spending Clause, private actions are
available only where recipients of federal funds have had adequate
notice that they could be liable. 146 The majority stated that the
school board should have been put on notice1 47 due to the Court's
1979 ruling in Cannon,148 holding Title IX broadly encompasses di-
verse forms of intentional sex discrimination. "A reasonable school
board would realize that institutions covered by Tide IX cannot
cover up violations of that law by means of discriminatory
retaliation."' 49
Justice Thomas dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices Scalia and Kennedy. The dissenters would require
Congress to unambiguously state any conditions placed on funding
recipients because Title IX was enacted under Congress's spending
power.' 50 Furthermore, the dissenters opined that a claim of retali-
144. See id. at 1504-05 (citing N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521
(1982)). Furthermore, Congress enacted Title IX three years after Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). See Jackson III, 125 S. Ct. at 1506. Thus,
Congress must have been thoroughly familiar with the decision and must have
expected that Title IX's enactment would be interpreted in conformity with its
prohibition against retaliation. See id.
145. See id. at 1501 ("[I]t does not require that the victim of the retaliation
also be the victim of the discrimination that is the subject of the original com-
plaint."). Further, according to the Court, reporting incidents of sex discrimina-
tion is essential, and reporting would be discouraged if whistleblowers were not
protected. See id. Teachers and coaches are often the best at identifying discrimi-
nation and bringing it to the attention of administrators. See id.
146. See Jackson III, 125 S. Ct. at 1501 (quoting Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999)). The majority stated that the school board's reli-
ance on Alexander v. Sandoval was misplaced. See id. For a discussion of which fac-
tors to consider when determining equal opportunity, see supra notes 38-41 and
accompanying text.
147. See id. (emphasizing importance of notice).
148. For a discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying
text.
149. Jackson III, 125 S. Ct. at 1504 (notingJackson will still have to prove on
remand that he was retaliated against because he complained about sex
discrimination).
150. See id. at 1510 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (requiring more comprehensive
disclosure of limiting conditions).
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ation is not a claim of sex discrimination, and the plain meaning of
"on the basis of sex" is on the basis of one's own sex.151
Additionally, the dissenters placed more weight on Title IX's
text, which does not mention retaliation. 152 In contrast, retaliation
is mentioned in Title VII, 153 the Americans With Disabilities Act,1
5 4
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 155 According to
the dissent, a better assumption would have been if Congress in-
tended to include a claim of retaliation, it would have expressly in-
cluded such a claim. 15 6
As to the requisite notice, the dissenters stated that prior court
jurisprudence "hardly gave notice to the Board here that retaliation
liability loomed."' 57 Even more importantly, according to the dis-
sent, "[T]he Court's rationale untethers notice from the statute."1 58
The dissent concluded that:
[B]y crafting its own additional enforcement mechanism,
the majority returns this Court to the days in which it cre-
ated remedies out of whole cloth to effectuate its vision of
congressional purpose. In doing so, the majority substi-
tutes its policy judgments for the bargains struck by Con-
gress, as reflected in the statute's text. The question
151. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (according to dissent, Jackson's claim
lacks requisite connection to actual sex discrimination).
152. See id. at 1511 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[T]hat the text of Title IX does
not mention retaliation is significant.").
153. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2005) ("It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants
for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management commit-
tee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining."). The statute also
prohibits on-the-job training programs from discrimination, as well as labor organi-
zations, from discriminating against any member or applicant for membership due
to his opposition to an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter, "or
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." Id.
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2005) ("No person shall discriminate against
any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made un-
lawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted,
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this chapter.").
155. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1998) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of
age).
156. See Jackson III, 125 S. Ct. at 1511 (Thomas,J., dissenting) (refuting major-
ity's recognition of retaliation claim). Therefore, Justice Thomas asserts the ma-
jority's statement that Congress must have been aware of Sullivan and finding its
inclusion of retaliation under Title IX was "wholly misplaced." Id. at 1516
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1515 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
158. See id. (Thomas,J., dissenting) ("Rather than requiring clarity from Con-
gress, the majority requires clairvoyance from funding recipients.").
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before us is only whether Title IX prohibits retaliation, not
whether prohibiting it is good policy.159
D. CONCLUSION
Title IX and its regulations have played an important role in
providing opportunities and preventing discrimination on the basis
of sex to those who participate in and receive benefits from feder-
ally funded institutions.160 Coaches, administrators, and student
athletes must be aware of Title IX's complex regulatory environ-
ment and judicial interpretations. The U.S. Supreme Court has in-
terpreted Title IX on numerous occasions.1 61 In March, 2005, the
U.S. Supreme Court most recently held that Title IX's implied pri-
vate right of action now also includes retaliation because an individ-
ual has raised concerns about sex discrimination.1 62 This landmark
ruling now explicitly puts educational institutions receiving federal
funds on notice that retaliating against an individual who com-
plains about sex discrimination will not be allowed under Title IX.
Thus, school boards and school districts should immediately amend
policies, procedures, and Title IX enforcement to reflect this
landmark Supreme Court decision in order to prevent retaliation
against individuals who complain about sex discrimination. If an
institution wishes to make an adverse decision against an individual
who has previously complained of sex discrimination, the institu-
tion must ensure that the decision was non-retaliatory in nature,
clearly documented, and legally defensible. 163
Retaliation is already prohibited in several federal employee
protection statutes. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,164 the
159. Id. at 1517 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994)).
160. For a discussion on Title IX of Educational Amendment of 1972, see
supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
161. For a further discussion on the extensive litigation and debate involving
Tide IX, see supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
162. For a summary on the landmark ruling in Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of
Educ. (Jackson II), 125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005), see supra notes 19-22 and accompanying
text.
163. For a discussion of the prohibition of discriminatory retaliation, see
supra note 149. A plaintiff allegedly retaliated against must prove that the retalia-
tion occurred as a consequence of complaining about sex discrimination. See Jack-
son 11, 125 S. Ct. at 1507.
164. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2005) (making it unlawful for employer to
discriminate against employee because employee has charged, testified, assisted, or
participated in investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII).
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Age Discrimination in Employment Act,165 the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act, 166 and the Equal Pay Act 167 all statutorily prohibit an
employer's retaliation. The essential elements of a retaliation claim
are 1) the employee engaged in a protected activity, 168 2) there was
an adverse action by the employer, and 3) there is a causal connec-
tion between the protected activity and the adverse action. 169 In
the 2004 fiscal year, the EEOC received 22,740 charges of retalia-
tion discrimination based upon all statutes enforced by the
EEOC. 170 In 2004, discharge was alleged in 66 percent of the suits
filed by the EEOC with retaliation as a basis of the suit. 1 7 1 The
likely impact of Jackson III will be that more retaliation claims and
suits will be filed by those alleging discrimination on the basis of sex
in federally funded educational institutions.
The removal of sex discrimination from educational institu-
tions which receive federal funds172 and the prohibition of retalia-
tion against whistleblowers at such institutions are strongly
supported. While this author concurs in the outcome of Jackson III,
this author would be more comfortable with the prohibition com-
ing from Congress instead of the courts. For example, Congress
has expanded whistleblower protection under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, which provides that publicly traded firms may not retaliate
against their whistle-blowing employees.' 73 Sarbanes-Oxley also ex-
plicitly criminalizes intentional retaliation, including the interfer-
165. For a further discussion of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
see supra note 155 and accompanying text.
166. For a further discussion of the Americans with Disabilities Act, see supra
note 154 and accompanying text.
167. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a) (3) (2005).
168. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC COMPLI-
ANCE MANUAL 3 (1998), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.html (recogniz-
ing opposition to discrimination as protected activity).
169. See id. (acknowledging also participation in statutory complaint process
as protected activity).
170. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, RETALIATION 3
(2005), http://www.eeoc.gov/types/retaliation.html (remarking that EEOC actu-
ally resolved 24,751 retaliation charges in 2004, more than were filed that year, and
recovered more than $90 million in monetary damages).
171. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, OFFICE OF GEN-
ERAL COUNSEL FY 2004 ANNUAL REPORT-SUMMARY OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS 32 (2005),
http://www.eeoc.gov/litigation/04annrpt/index.html (noting 66 percent of suits
filed by EEOC alleged retaliation).
172. This author has been active in equity and gender equity issues in athlet-
ics at Bowling Green State University.
173. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (providing protection for whistleblowing employ-
ees of publicly traded companies in fraud cases).
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ence with lawful employment, against whistleblowers.17 4 Perhaps if
the Jackson III decision had swung five-to-four in the other direc-
tion, Congress would have remedied this omission as they did with
the Civil Rights Restoration Act175 after the Grove City College case. 1 76
As the Jackson III dissent states, 77 this is not a statement about the
merits of an anti-retaliation policy, but it is rather a statement that
notice to the educational institutions affected must be clear and un-
ambiguous under the Spending Clause. Instead, an anti-retaliation,
pro-whistleblower policy would have been preferable.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the first woman to serve on the
U.S. Supreme Court, played a key role in upholding rights under
Title IX. Justice O'Connor authored the majority opinion in Jack-
son 111.178 While Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority in
the narrow holding in Grove City College v. Bell,179 Justice O'Connor
joined the majority in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,
holding that damages are available under Title IX.180 Justice
O'Connor authored the majority opinion in Gebser, which held that
a school district is not liable in damages for sexual harassment by a
teacher unless there was actual notice of and indifference to the
teacher's conduct. 181 A year later in Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, however, Justice O'Connor authored the majority deci-
sion holding that student-on-student sexual harassment is actiona-
ble if the board acted with deliberate indifference and the
174. See 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e)(2005) (protecting individuals from employer's
retaliatory conduct).
Whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes any action harmful
to any person ... for providing to a law enforcement officer any truthful
information relating to the commission or possible commission of any
Federal offense, shall be fined.., or imprisoned not more than 10 years,
or both.
Id.
175. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (exploring application of Civil
Rights Restoration Act).
176. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1984) (describing
holding of case).
177. For an analysis of the Supreme Court's dissent in Jackson III, 125 S. Ct.
1497 (2005), see supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
178. See Jackson III, 125 S. Ct. at 1502-03 (listingJustice O'Connor as author of
opinion).
179. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. Jus-
tice O'Connor was appointed and confirmed to the Court in 1981 and thus took
no part in Cannon in 1979.
180. For a discussion of claims for monetary damages under implied right of
private action under Title IX, see supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
181. For more information on Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Gebser
v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274 (1998), see supra note 82 and
accompanying text.
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harassment was sufficiently severe, pervasive, and offensive. 182 The
Davis majority consisted of Justices O'Connor, Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer; while the more conservative Justices Scalia
and Thomas, along with Kennedy and the Chief Justice Rehnquist,
dissented. By authoring numerous of these opinions, Justice
O'Connor has thus left her mark on Title IX jurisprudence.
At the time of this publication, Justice O'Connor has retired
from the Court and Judge Samuel Alito has been confirmed. It is
interesting to speculate that had Jackson III come to the Court one
year later, it may have swung five-to-four the other way, leaving it to
Congress to add retaliation to the Title IX statute, as other federal
employee protection statutes provide.18 3 Judge Alito, while serving
on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, authored an opinion in
Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh,18 4 which held that allegedly retaliatory
conduct on the part of the employer did not give rise to a claim of
retaliation. While Robinson's complaint with the EEOC for sexual
harassment was a protected activity, the Third Circuit opined that
the actions which occurred after the complaint did not give rise to
adverse employment action.18 5 Based upon this single retaliation in
employment precedent, Judge Alito, given the opportunity, may
have agreed with the dissent in Jackson IlL
The Jackson III majority statement that school boards should
have been on notice that retaliation under Title IX was actionable
even prior to that decision is respectfully questioned. 186 School
boards across this nation are filled with hard-working individuals
dedicated to education and equality of all students, but it is uncer-
182. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (commenting on impact of Su-
preme Court's decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629
(1999)). Justice O'Connor joined the majority in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.
275, 293 (2001), a Title VI and not a Title IX case, along with the more conserva-
tive justices. For a further discussion of Sandoval, see supra notes 90-94 and accom-
panying text.
183. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text (highlighting express stat-
utory language in federal legislation addressing retaliation).
184. 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997).
185. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text (discussing definition of
protected activity by EEOC). In addition, some of what Robinson claimed was
retaliation allegedly occurred before the complaint was filed. See Robinson, 120
F.3d at 1300.
186. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's
views regarding school board's notice). This author also prefers the inference that
the dissent prefers: if Congress intended to include a clause in a statute, it would
have expressly included it, rather than the majority's assumption that Congress was
familiar with a prior Supreme Court decision in Sullivan and expected retaliation
to be read into the statute. See supra note 156 (highlighting dissent's assumption
about Congress's intention regarding retaliation).
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tain whether all school boards were aware before Jackson III that
retaliation should be read into Title IX's implied private rights of
actions. Now, however, school boards are on explicit notice that
such behavior will not be tolerated.
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education (Jackson III) 187 makes
it clear that retaliation claims are now actionable under Tide IX.
Educational institutions receiving federal funds must now be even
more diligent not to retaliate against an individual, male or female,
who has complained about sex discrimination. Thus, Title IX's leg-
acy, after thirty-four years, is still the pursuit of gender equity and
the rights of those seeking gender equity in federally funded educa-
tional institutions.
187. 125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005).
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